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How Is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?t
Addison C. Harris Lecture
January 21, 1998
HAROLD HONGu KOH"
I am greatly honored to deliver this distinguished Lecture, particularly given the
illustrious list of lecturers who have preceded me to this podium.' My own path to
this podium began in Washington, D.C., where as a private lawyer I specialized in
issues of international business and trade law: what most American law schools
now think of as "international business transactions."2 But even while working on
these matters, I became increasingly diverted toward the novel, growing field of
international human rights. While in private practice in the early 1980s, I became
involved in the representation of the American hostages who had been held for 444
days in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Once starting an academic career, I took
occasional forays into international human rights advocacy,4 but my main focus
remained on the law of international business transactions and United States foreign
policy, two examples of what Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts have felicitously
dubbed "Transnational Legal Problems."'
t ) 1999 Harold Hongju Koh.
* Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director, Orville
H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School (on leave), Assistant
United States Secretary of State, Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. These remarks were
originally delivered as the January 1998 Addison Harris Lecture at the University of Indiana School
of Law-Bloomington. They grow out of a chapter in a forthcoming book entitled Why Nations
Obey: A Theory of Compliance With InternationalLaw, which I am writing under the auspices
of the Century Foundation and the Guggenheim Foundation. This Lecture also shares thoughts
with my 1998 Frankel Lecture at the University of Houston Law Center, Houston, Texas, and the
1997 Waynflete Lectures at Magdalen College, Oxford University. I am deeply grateful to Dean
Alfred Aman, Acting Dean Lauren Rebel, Dean Kelly Townes, Professor David Williams, the
Harris Lecture Speaker's Committee, and the Editors of the Indiana Law Journal for their
enormous hospitality while I was in Hoosier country.
Not long after delivering this Lecture, I was nominated and confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the Clinton Administration. These lightly edited remarks,
which have been footnoted for publication, obviously represent only my own views, and not
necessarily those of the United States Department of State.
1. Past Harris lecturers include my former Harvard professors Paul Bator and Charles Fried,
as well as my current Yale colleagues Guido Calabresi, Owen Fiss, Jules Coleman, and Robert
Gordon.
2. See genera//y Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalBusiness Transactions in United States
Courts, 261 RECUBILDES COURS 13 (1996).
3. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
4. See, e.g., David Cole et al., Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae
Memorandum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12
HASTINGS INTL & CoN,,. L. REv. 1 (1988).
5. See generaty HENY J. STEINRR ETAL, RsNATIONAL LEGAL PRoBLEMS (4th ed. 1994).
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As this decade began, international human rights law became the primary focus
of both my theoretical and academic work, when I became involved with my
students in a number of lawsuits in U.S. courts against human rights violators. In
1992, my students and I brought suits on behalf of the Haitian and Cuban refugees
against the U.S. government6 and a number of lawsuits against foreign human rights
violators who had come to the United States-the former Guatemalan Minister of
Defense, the former dictator of Haiti, an Indonesian general responsible for the
1991 Dili massacre in East Timor, and most recently a suit that is still ongoing in
the Southern District of New York against Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the
Bosnian Serbs!
In each of these legal lives, as a scholar and a lawyer, I have asked the question
that titles this Lecture, namely, "How is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?" I wouldn't be surprised if many of you hearing that question were to
give a pessimistic answer: international human rights law is not enforced, you might
say. Just take a look at the massive human rights violations in Bosnia, violations
that have gone unredressed in Cambodia and Iraq; the continuing crises in the
Congo, Sierra Leone, Algeria, and Burundi. Look at indicted war criminals, like
Radovan Karadzic in Republica Srpska, who continue to flout the jurisdictions of
the Bosnian war crimes tribunal. Look, you might say, at the world's willingness to
overlook human rights violations committed by more powerful nations, such as
Russia's activities in Chechnya, or China's continuing repression after Tienanmen
Square. International human rights law is not enforced, you might say, because
human rights norms are vague and aspirational, because enforcement mechanisms
are toothless, because treaty regimes are notoriously weak, and because national
governments lack the economic self-interest or the political will to restrain their
own human rights violations. So if the question is "how is international human
rights law enforced?", many ofyou might answer: "not at all, or hardly at all." If you
hold to this common, skeptical view of human rights enforcement, you would say
that international human rights law is not enforced, like "real" domestic lavr,
instead, it is only occasionally "complied with," by nation-states acting out of
transparent convenience or self-interest.
In this Lecture, let me take a somewhat different tack, asking first, "What do we
mean when we say that any laws are enforced?" Are any laws perfectly enforced?
Even here in Bloomington, Indiana, the height of civilization, are the parking laws
or burglary laws perfectly enforced? Of course, you would concede, parking
violations occur here in Bloomington, and burglaries occur, perhaps even daily;
6. See Cuban-American BarAss'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1995); Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp.
1028 (E.DI.Y. 1993). For an account ofthese cases, written by three of my students, see Victoria
Clawson et al, Litigating asLaw Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council, 103 YAL
L.J. 2337 (1994).
7. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Todd v. Panjaitan, No 92-
12255WD (D. Mass. decided Oct 25, 1994) ($14 million judgment awarded); Doe v. Karadzic,
886 F. Supp. 734 (S.DI..Y. 1994), rev'd sub non Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ($41 million judgment awarded); Ortiz v.
Gramajo, No. 91-11612WD (D. Mass. filed Sept 17, 1992) ($47.5 million judgment awarded).
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sometimes egregiously. But those facts alone hardly mean that there is no
enforcement of laws against parking violations or burglary. Here in Indiana, the
laws against burglary may be underenforced, they may be imperfectly enforced, but
they are enforced, through a well-understood domestic legalprocess of legislation,
adjudication, and executive action. That process involves prosecutors, statutes,
judges, police officers, and penalties that interact, interpret legal norms, and work
to internalize those norms into the value sets of citizens like ourselves.
But if we are willing to give that answer to the question "how is domestic law
enforced?", why not similarly answer the question whether international human
rights law is enforced? In this Lecture, I will argue that in much the same way,
these international norms of international human rights law are underenforced,
imperfectly enforced; but they are enforced through a complex, little-understood
legal process that I call transnational egalprocess. As I have elaborated in other
writing," for shorthand purposes, transnational legal process can be thought of in
three phases: the institutional interaction whereby global norms of international
human rights law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately internalized by domestic
legal systems. To claim that this complex transnational legal process of enforcing
international human rights law via interaction, interpretation, and internalization
exists is not to say that it always works or even that it works very well. As I will be
the first to concede, this process works sporadically, and that we often most clearly
see its spectacular failures, as in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. But the process
of enforcing international human rights law also sometimes has its successes, which
gives us reason not to ignore that process, but to try to develop and nurture it. Just
as doctors used early successes in addressing polio to push our understanding of
how the prevention and healing process works, lawyers can try to globalize the
lessons of human rights enforcement. So if the question is "how is international
human rights enforced?", my short answer is through a transnational legal process
of institutional interaction, interpretation of legal norms, and attempts to
internalize those norms into domestic legal systems.
With that introduction, let me divide the balance of these remarks into two parts:
First, how, in theory, does transnational legal process promote national obedience
of international human rights law? Second, how does transnational legal
process-this process that I call "interaction, interpretation and
internalization"-work in real cases?
I. THE THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
The first question, why do nations obey international human rights law, is really
a sub-set of a much broader question: why do nations obey international law of any
kind? That timeless question, which has troubled thinkers over historical eras dating
back to the Roman Empire, is the subject of a book I am writing, under the title
8. For fuller discussion oftanmsnational legal process, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996); Harold Hongiu Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture:
Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Frankel
Lecture], and Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, WhyDo Nations ObeyInternationalLaw?].
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"Why Nations Obey?". My forthcoming book examines both the theoretical and the
historical answers to that question.9
A. From Compliance to Obedience
Let us start by asking what it means to "obey" international law at all. Imagine
four kinds of relationships between rules and conduct: coincidence, conformity,
compliance, and obedience. For example, I have lived my whole life in the United
States; but a few years ago, I took a sabbatical year in England. While there, I
noticed that everybody drives on the left side of the road, as a matter of both
practice and of law. Yet what is the relationship between the law and the observed
practice?
One remote possibility is coincidence. It could be coincidence that the law is that
everyone must drive on the left and that in practice everybody follows that norm.
Yet coincidence might explain why one person follows a rule, but not why millions
of people throughout the country do the same. That suggests a second possibility:
conformity. If people know of the rule that you must drive on the left, they may well
choose to conform their conduct to that rule when convenient; but feel no obligation
to do so when inconvenient. (Perhaps some Scots, for example, swerve over and
drive on the right, in remote unpopulated areas of the Hebrides). But, is there a
third possibility, compliance? Perhaps people are both aware of the rule and accept
the rule for a variety of external reasons, for example, to get specific rewards, to
receive insurance benefits, or to avoid certain kinds of bad results, such as traffic
tickets, or getting hit by an oncoming car. These are instrumental reasons why
someone might decide to comply with a rule even if they felt no moral obligation
to obey it. Finally, there is a fourth possibility, obedience: the notion that a person
or an organization adopts the behavior that is prescribed by the rule because he or
it has somehow internalized that rule and made it a part of their internal value
system.
Notice that as we move down this scale from coincidence to conformity to
compliance to obedience, we see an increase of what I will call "norm-
internalization." As you move from grudgingly accepting a rule one time only to
habitually obeying it, the rule transforms from being some kind of external sanction
to becoming an internal imperative. We see this evolutionary process regularly in
our daily lives: when you put on a bicycle helmet; when you snap on your seatbelt;
when you recycle a tin can; when you do not smoke in the law school cafeteria. All
of these are examples of people moving from conformity with a rule to compliance
and gradually obedience, which is driven by a sense of an internalized norm. Over
time, we also witness a rise in what one might call "normativity." If you see
someone driving 100 mph, and then suddenly they see a police car and slow
dramatically to 60 mph, you might say they are complying with; but not really
obeying the speed limit But, if one witnesses people routinely driving at the speed
limit (without witnesses around), or routinely disposing of litter, or recycling
without being told, we are seeing an internalized normative form of behavior-an
9. For the gist of both answers, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, supra
note 8.
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increase in normativity, if you will-which derives from the incorporation of
external norms or values into a person's or organization's internal value set.
There is a further point as well: namely, that the most effective form of law-
enforcement is not the imposition of external sanction, but the inculcation of
internal obedience. Most traffic laws, litter laws, tax laws and the like are enforced
primarily not by enforcement officers, but by the social internalization of norms of
obedience! Indeed, enforcement is maximized when a norm is so widely obeyed that
external sanctions become virtually unnecessary. As my Yale colleague Bob
Ellickson has demonstrated, when everyone in a community follows certain social
norms out of felt internal* normativity, order can be maintained without rigid
systems of external legal enforcement, because self-enforcement is both more
effective and more efficient than third-party controls.' Social psychologists who
study why individuals obey the law have reached the same conclusion."
B. The Relationship Between Enforcement and Obedience
With this background, let us now turn to the question of how international
human rights law is enforced, which is a subset of the larger question: why do
nations obey international law of any kind? In earlier writing, I have suggested that,
over time, five distinct explanations have emerged to answer the question "why
nations obey?": power, self-interest or rational choice; liberal explanations based
on rule-legitimacy or political identity; communitarian explanations; and legal
process explanations at the state-to-state level (what I will call "horizontal" or
"international legal process" explanations) and from the international-to-national
level (what I will call "vertical" or "transnational legal process explanations").'
In their current form, each of these five approaches gives their own short answer
to the question "how is international human rights law enforced?" Let me start with
the realists, who date back to Thomas Hobbes, but include such modern-day
theorists as George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger. To the
question "why do nations obey international law?", their short answer is power:
nations never truly "obey" international law, they only comply with it, because
10. See ROBERT C. ELLiCKsON, ORDER WrTHouT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SET=L DISPUTES
132 (1991) ("A person who has 'internalized' a social norm is by definition committed to self-
enforcement of a rule. ... ."); id. at 126 n.8 (1991) ("Whatever the origin of self-enforced moral
rules, there is broad agreement that the overall system of social control must depend vitally on
achieving cooperation through self-enforcement'); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and
Hwnan Frailty to RationalActors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CmI.-KENT
L. R v. 23,44 (1989) (arguing that the primary system of social control is a"first-party system
of social control that would operate without external enforcers') (emphasis in original).
11. See, e.g., ToMR.- TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (concluding, after extensive
empirical study, that people comply with law not so much because they fear punishment as
because they feel that legal authorities are legitimate); see also id. at 4 (urging authorities who seek
to promote voluntary compliance with laws to apply "[a] normative perspective [which] leads to
a focus on people's internalized norms ofjustice and obligation," rather than "an instrumental
perspective [which] regards compliance as a form of behavior occurring in response to external
factors').
12. Both the historical and theoretical analysis are fleshed out in Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, supra note 8, from which this portion of the Lecture derives.
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someone else makes them. Why, for example, why did Iraq ultimately respect the
borders of Kuwait? In the end, because the other nations of the world came in and
drove Saddam out! Under this view, nations can be coerced or bribed to follow
certain rules, or even induced to bargain in the shadow of such incentives. But in
the end, the critical factor is neither altruistic or normative, only the realist values
of power and coercion. 3 Thus, the familiar power explanation traces back to
Thucydides: the strong states do what they can, the weak states suffer what they
must, but in the end there is no real "obedience" of international law, only such
coincidence between national conduct and international rules that results from
power and coercion.
There is a second, kinder and gentler explanation, based on the self-interest
rationales favored by the vibrant school of "rational choice" theory. 4 Under this
explanation, nations may choose rationally to follow certain global rules out of a
sense of self-interest. After participating in game-theoretic discussions, to avoid
multi-party prisoners' dilemma, nations may decide to cooperate around certain
rules, which lead them to establish what international relations theorists call
"regimes": governing arrangements in which certain governing norms, rules, and
decisionmaking procedures come to predominate because the nations in their long-
term self-interests have calculated that they should follow a presumption favoring
compliance with such rules.
This "self- interest" rationale helps explains why, for example, complex global
rules have emerged in a whole variety of international areas in which nations have
established regimes structured around legal rules born of self-interested
cooperation. In the contemporary era, for example, talented international relations
scholars such as Robert Keohane, Duncan Snidal, and Oran Young have applied
increasingly sophisticated rational choice techniques to argue for such an
instrumental, interest-based view of international law. Redently, a number of legal
scholars, most prominently Kenneth Abbott, Alan Sykes, and John Setear have
espoused a similar, "rationalistic" legal vision. Under the rationalist account,
participants in a given issue area will develop a set of governing arrangements,
along with a set of expectations, rules, and decisionmaking procedures-in other
words, a regime-both to restrain the participants and to provide means for
achieving their common aims. Within these regimes, international law stabilizes
expectations and promotes compliance by reducing transaction costs, providing
dispute-resolution procedures, performing signaling functions, triggering negative
responses, and promoting information disclosure.
13. The "power" alionale is captured in a famous joke often told about Henry Kissinger, who
after he ceased to be the Secretay of State, reportedly went to work as a zoo keeper. After the first
day, zoo patrons noticed an amazing phenomenon: that after all of these centuries, the lion was
finally lying down with the lamb. The patrons ran excitedly to Dr. Kissinger, and asked, "How
have you achieved this miraculous result?" The famous realist replied, "Its simple. A lamb a day!"
14. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbo% Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectusfor
International Lawyers, 14 YALE . INT'L L. 335 (1989); Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading
Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law ofInternational Trade, 26 HA1V. INT'L L.L 501
(1985); Kenneth W. Abbott, nTrustBut Verify" The Production ofInformation in Arms Control
Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements, 26 CORNELLINT'LL.J. 1 (1993).
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Recently, more sophisticated instrumentalists have begun to disaggregate the
state into its component parts, to introduce international institutions and
transnational actors, to incorporate long-term self-interest, and to consider the issue
within massively iterated multi-party games.' 5 Subtler instrumentalists even
recognize that global rules form part of the environment faced by a state and thus
alter the incentives of domestic interest groups and organizations. But even so, their
analysis remains thin.
The rationalists recognize nonstate actors as players in the transnational system,
but too often ignore them because of the complexity their inclusion adds to their
game-theoretic analysis. Nor do these analysts tell much of a domestic politics
story, because they tend to operate largely at the horizontal level of the international
system Their chosen issue areas thus tend to be areas like trade and arms control,
where nation-states remain the primary players and traditional realist assumptions
still largely prevail. Such rationalistic, state-centric theories thus work less well, for
example, in such areas as human rights, debt restructuring, or international
commercial transactions, where nonstate actors abound, pursue multiple goals in
complex nonzero-sum games, and interact repeatedly within institutions nested
within broader informal regimes. Rationalists see law as regulating behavior by
changing incentives, not altering interests or identities. The role of norms, in their
view, is to reduce transactions costs in dynamic interactions among exogenously
constituted actors. Shared norms, and the interactive processes by which those
norms are interpreted, have little effect on state policies. In effect, they see
international law as a kind of mechanical device, a switching mechanism, which
facilitates the interactions of autonomous states, not as a communal decisionmaking
structure that helps generate options, modify preferences, and build a normative
interpretive community.
In short, my major complaint about the self-interest explanation is that it does not
take account of what I consider to be an important factor-the "vertical"
internalization of international norms into domestic legal systems. The rationalists'
picture takes too little account of the internalizing, normative, or constitutive impact
of participating in the transnational legal process. For the rationalists, the decision
to obey the law remains perpetually calculated, never internally felt. Compliance
always remains an instrumental computation, never an internalized normative
imperative. 1
6
This brings me to a third possible explanation for why international human rights
laws are enforced, so-called "liberal" theories, which I divide into those scholars
who follow principles of "rule legitimacy" and those who focus on national
"political identity." Both sets of theorists derive their analysis from Immanuel
Kant's pamphlet in 1795, Perpetual Peace. Rule-legitimacy theorists, led by
Thomas Franck of NYU, argue that nations do feel some sort of internal
"compliance pull" toward certain rules that they feel are legitimate; for example,
15. Duke's Robert Keohane is the leading exemplar of such a sophisticated approach. See
Robert O. Keohane, When Does InternationalLaw Come Home?, 35 Hous. L. REV. 699 (1998).
16. Itwould be as if every time you got into a car, you calculatedfor the first time whether or
not to put on a seat belt or to stop for a red light, rather than relying upon internalized norms of
obedience.
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the rules against genocide or the rules favoring diplomatic immunity. When nations
perceive that rules are legitimate, either because they meet some procedural
standard of legitimacy or some substantive notion of due process or distributive
justice, they will obey that rule because they are "normatively pulled" toward that
rule by its legitimacy.17
In my view, this rule-legitimacy approach is problematic because it claims to
draw its power from the legitimacy of rules themselves, rather than from
communitarian and legal process pressures. In fact, most of us do not litter when
others are watching, but not because the no-littering rule itself has such compliance
pull, but because of a combination of internal impulse and felt peer pressure. In the
same way, Franck's rule-legitimacy ends up being another way of saying that a state
obeys a norm because it has been both internalized, and is being enforced by
"communitarian peer pressure" (which, I will argue below, is really a form of
transnational legal process)."8
A second view, pressed strongly by other members of this liberal school, argues
that whether or not nations comply with international law depends crucially on the
extent to which their political identity is based on liberal democracy. This approach
derives from a branch of international relations literature known as the "Democratic
Peace" literature, pioneered by Michael Doyle of Princeton, my Yale colleague
Bruce Russett, and many others who have sought to verify a basic tenet of Kant's
writing that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. The many
adherents of this view include President Clinton, who in October of 1995 opined
that promoting democracies that participate in the new global marketplace is the
right thing to do because we know that these democracies are less likely to go to
war.
Transposing this basic maxim to international lawi several Harvard theorists,
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Andrew Moravcsik, have flipped this maxim, arguing
not so much that democracies do not fight each other, but rather, that democracies
are more inclined to "do law" with one another. For these analysts, the key variable
for whether a nation will or will not obey international law is whether they can be
characterized as "liberal" in identity, i.e., having certain democratic attributes such
as a form of representative government, civil and political rights, and an
independent judicial system dedicated to the rule of law. Not surprisingly, many
liberal scholars focus on European Union law, noting that the European system of
human rights works because it is largely composed of liberal democracies, who
share reasons for collective obedience. This helps explain why, for example, the
embryonic African human rights system-a collection of democracies and
authoritarian systems-does not work nearly as well.
What is troubling about this view is that it suggests that liberal states interact
mainly in a zone of law, while liberal and illiberal states interact in a zone of
politics. But in my view, any analysis that treats a state's identity as somehow
17. Franck calls tils the "compliance pull" of particular international legal rules. See generally
THoMAs M. FRANiC, THE PowR OF LEGnMA~cYAMONG NATIONS (1990).
18. Franck defines rule-legitimacy as "a property of a rule which exerts a pull towards
compliance on those addressed nomalively, because they believe that the rule has come into being
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process," that is, an
internalized view of fair legal process. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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exogenously or permanently given, is overly essentialist. National identities, like
national interests, are socially constructed products of culture, ideology, learning,
and knowledge. As we have witnessed, nations like South Africa, Nigeria,
Indonesia, Poland, Argentina, Chile, and the Czech Republic are neither
permanently liberal nor illiberal, but transition back and forth from dictatorship to
democracy. As Laurence Whitehead has argued, democratization has powerful
international dimensions, potentially spreading from one country to another by
contagion, control, or consent.19 Liberal identity analysis does not directly address
the impact of compliance on democratization, and thus leaves unanswered a critical,
constructivist question: to what extent does compliance with international law itself
help constitute the identity of a state as law-abiding, and hence, as "liberal" or not?
The notion that "only liberal states do law with one another" can be empirically
falsified, particularly in such areas as international commercial law, where even
rogue states like Libya tend to abide fastidiously by private international law rules
on letters of credit without regard to whether they are representative democracies.
Finally, like the "cultural relativist" argument in human rights, the claim that
nonliberal states somehow do not participate in a zone of law denies the
universalism of international law and effectively condones dealing with nonliberal
states within a realist world of power politics.
In more recent writings, some liberal authors have revised their positions to say
that they view liberal states not as actors, but as representative agents for various
institutions and groups within civil society. These institutions and groups are more
likely to engage in transborder cooperation with one another, thus predicting greater
levels of transnational legal relations among liberal states. But if this is so, what it
suggests is that the density of a state's interactions in the transnational legal
process-not its label as liberal or illiberal-is the key to explaining its level of
compliance with international law.
A fourth possible explanation---"communitarian" reasons--can be found in the
English "International Society" school of International Relations, particularly in the
work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, who traced their international origins back
to the Dutch international law scholar Grotius. These theorists argue that nations
obey international law because of the values of the international society of which
they are a part. So, for example, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary now feel
peer pressure to obey international law because of their community ties, now as
NATO nations. The idea is that one's membership in a community helps to define
how one views the obligations of that community. So, for example, when someone
becomes a member of a church, they decide they will conduct their lives differently
because they now view themselves as Catholic, Jewish, or Muslim. Similarly, under
this view, the governments of Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey should all feel
communitarian pressure to obey the European Convention on Human Rights-the
"rules of their church"-because they have all now become members of the Council
of Europe.
19. Laurence Whitehead, Three International Dimensions of Democratization, in Tur
INmIRATIONALDIMENSIONSOFDEMOCRATIZATION 3,5-22 (Laurence Whitehead ed., 1996) ("In
the contemporary world, there is no such thing as democratization in one country, and perhaps
there never was.").
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Unlike a liberal approach, this communitarian, constructivist approach at least
recognizes the positive transformational effects of a state's repeated participation
in the legal process. At the same time, however, the approach gives too little study
to the vertical "transmission belt" whereby the norms created by international
society infiltrate into domestic society. The existence of international community
may explain the horizontal pressures to compliance generated among nation-states
on the global plane, but it does not clarify the vertical process whereby
transnational actors interact in various fora, generate and interpret international
norms, and then seek to internalize those norms domestically, as future determinants
of why nations obey.
Fifth and finally, there are so-called "legal process" explanations for why nations
obey international law. Let me distinguish here between what I call "international
legal process" or horizontal reasons for compliance, which tend to function at a
government-to-government level,2" and the so-called "vertical" explanation, which
focuses on the relationship between the international and the domestic legal
systems. Suppose, for example, that the government of Canada wishes to urge Japan
to join the global land mine treaty. Initially, the two governments will engage in
government-to-government discussions at the "horizontal" nation-state level within
an intergovernmental process organized by the United Nations. But at the same
time, there is also a "vertical," transnational process whereby governments, inter-
governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens
argue together about why nations should obey international human rights law.
Through this vertical dynamic, international rules that are developed at a
government-to-government level gradually work their way down and become
internalized into domestic legal structure. Take, for example, recent legal
enactments whereby global norms regarding genocide, war crimes, torture, and
religious freedom have become internalized into American legal rules.
What I have just recounted is a very compressed version of a small bookshelf of
political science and international law and literature. But my broader point, simply
speaking, is that all five explanations-power, self-interest, liberal theories,
communitarian theories, and legal process explanations-work together to help
explain why nations obey international law. These five explanatory strands work
together as complementary conceptual lenses to give a richer explanation of why
compliance with international law does, or does not, occur in particular cases.
To clarify, let me ask the parallel question, how is domestic law enforced? What
is the explanation, for example, for why we now buckle our seatbelts, even though
nobody wore seatbelts only a quarter of a century ago? Of course, there are many
reasons, but if you thought to explain the change in compliance, you probably
would give a variety of explanations. If you organized those explanations in your
own mind, they would likely fall under five headings: power or coercion, self-
20. The best exemplar of this international process view is ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEw SoVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMEm (1995), which treats the primary instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties
as "an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider
public," id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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interest, liberal theories, communitarian explanations, and legal process
explanations.
Why do I now wear a seatbelt, when I never did before? First, because after the
seatbelt rule issued, a lot of tickets were given out and I felt coerced to comply: a
power explanation. A second factor: self-interest. People calculated that it is more
rational to wear your seatbelt to avoid injury, sanction, or to gain insurance benefits.
Third, the seatbelt rule acquired "rule-legitimacy" and over time developed a
compliance pull. Over time, this became part of one's sense of personal identity.
Individuals calculated: "If I am a law abiding person, I ought to obey the seatbelt
laws." Partly, the rationale was communitarian. Authorities exhorted people with
slogans such as "Seatbelts Save Lives." And fifth and finally, the seatbelt rule was
inculcated via legal process. Seatbelts were required by state laws, required by
federal highway standards; incorporated into federal automotive standards and
became part of the way the automobiles were made. Now you cannot get into a car
and drive without buckling your seatbelt without every bell and whistle and
electronic voice in the car erupting into a cacophony of noise, making your life
miserable until you buckle your seatbelt!
So in short, how are seatbelt laws enforced? Not by any one of these factors
acting alone, but by all of them acting in combination. As we move through the five
explanations-from power to legal process-we also move from external
enforcement of legal rules to internal obedience with legal rules. True compliance
is not so much the result of externally imposed sanctions so much as internally felt
norms. In other words, as we move from external to internal factors, we also move
from coercive to constitutive behavior. My children, who have been wholly
socialized to wear seatbelts, have wholly internalized the norm. They view wearing
seatbelts as an integral part of what it means to be a law-abiding person. As always,
the best way to enforce legal norms is not to coerce action, not to impose sanctions,
but to change the way that people think about themselves: whether as teetotalers,
safe drivers, or regular taxpayers. In short, our prime way to enforce the law is to
encourage people to bring rules home, to internalize rules inside themselves, to
transform themselves from lawless into law-abiding individuals.
What does this have to do with international human rights law? I would argue that
in the international arena, we are seeing the exact same process at work; a process
by which norms and rules are generated and internalized and become internal rules,
normative rules, and rules that constitute new nations. The best example we have
is South Africa; a country which for many years was an outlaw, was subjected to
tremendous external pressure and coercive mechanisms over a long period of time.
Through a gradual process, South Africa has converted itself into a country that has
undergone a fundamental political transformation. It has now reconstituted itself as
a law-abiding country that through its constitutional processes has internalized new
norms of international human rights law as domestic law.
In the same way, if the United States is attempting to encourage China to follow
norms of international human rights law, the analysis above suggests the need to act
at all five levels: at the level of power and coercion, to apply external and political
sanctions; at the level of self-interest, to develop carrots that can be offered to
China in terms of trade benefits or other kinds of economic incentives; at the level
of liberal theory, to encourage Hong Kong's liberal legal identity to bubble up to
the Beijing government; at the level of communitarian values, to seek to encourage
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China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
multilateral communities of international human rights observance; and finally,
from a legal process perspective, to seek to engage the Chinese people and groups
in civil society in a variety of international interactions that will cause them to
internalize norms of international human rights law. As with the seat belt example,
our goal is not simply to coerce conduct More fundamentally, we seek to encourage
a change in the nature of the Chinese political identity to reconstitute China as a
nation that abides by core norms of international human rights law. In short, a
theory of transnational legal process geeks to enforce international norms by
motivating nation-states to obey international human rights law-out of a sense of
internal acceptance of international law-as opposed to merely conforming to or
complying with specific international legal rules when the state finds it convenient.
II. How Is INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ENFORCED?
Against this background, how should we now understand the recent history of
international human rights enforcement? Here let me contrast the two "process"
stories, the one that everyone usually looks at and the one that I think people should
look at. Let me contrast what I will call the horizontal story of enforcement with
what I prefer: the vertical, transnational story of human rights enforcement.
A. The "Horizontal" Story
The conventional "horizontal" story about international human rights law
enforcement is that international human rights law was born about fifty years ago,
the product of the U.N. Charter, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Under this view, the principal
enforcers of human rights law have always been nation-states, who have always
interacted with one another on an interstate, government-to-government level. The
U.N. Charter introduced into this picture U.N. organizations and U.N. norms,
which soon led to regional human rights systems as well: in Europe, the Strasbourg
(Council of Europe) and Helsinki (Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe) process; in the Americas, the Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights; and far less well developed regional human rights systems in Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia.
In this post-war order, an international regime developed in which governments
and inter-governmental organizations began to put pressure on each other-always
at a horizontal, intergovernmental level-to comply with human rights, invoking
such universal treaty norms as the international covenants on civil and political and
economic, social and cultural rights. U.N. organizations, such as the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, and treaty-based organizations, such as the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, participated as intergovernmental actors in this horizontal international
regime, which addressed all manner of global issues: worker rights, racial
discrimination, the rights of children, women, and indigenous peoples. As we soon
saw, the difficulties of this horizontal, state-to-state enforcement mechanism were
legion: the rules were largely declaratory and precatory, and the few mechanisms
created had virtually no enforcement. Occasionally new mechanisms would be
created: judicial fora, such as the Yugoslav and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal, or
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new executive actors, such as the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, or
new quasi-legislative fora, such as the Vienna Conference on Human Rights or the
1995 Beijing Women's Conference. Despite these occasional advances, the overall
picture of this standard enforcement story is one of impotence, ineffectiveness, of
a horizontal system where the key actors are nation-states and intergovernmental
organizations, the key forums are governmental forums, and the key transactions are
transactions between states and other states.
B. The "Vertical" Story
If one accepts the horizontal story as the entire picture of human rights
enforcement, than the glass is indeed more than half empty. But what is the vertical
picture? The "vertical" story of human rights enforcement, I would argue, is a much
richer picture: one that focuses on a transnational legal process that includes a
different set of actors, fora, and transactions. As I have recently argued in my
Frankel Lecture, "Bringing International Law Home," the key agents in this
transnational legal process are transnational norm entrepreneurs, governmental
norm sponsors, transnational issue networks, interpretive communities and law-
declaring fora, bureaucratic compliance procedures, and issue linkages among issue
areas.
2 1
Many efforts at human rights norm-internalization are begun not by nation-states,
but by "transnational norm entrepreneurs," private transnational organizations or
individuals who mobilize popular opinion and political support within their host
country and abroad for the development of a universal human rights norm. Such
norm entrepreneurs first became prominent in the nineteenth century, when activists
such as Lord William Wilberforce and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society
pressed for treaties prohibiting the slave trade,22 Jean-Henri Dunant founded the
International Committee of the Red Cross,23 and Christian peace activists, such as
America's William Ladd and Elihu Burritt promoted public international arbitration
and permanent international criminal courts.24 Modern-day entrepreneurs have
included individuals as diverse as Eleanor Roosevelt, Jesse Jackson, the Dalai
Lama, Aung Sang Suu Kyi, and Princess Diana. These nongovernmental actors seek
to develop transnational issue networks' to discuss and generate political solutions
21. See Koh, FrankelLecture, supra note 8, at 647-70.
22. On the transnational work of Wilberforce and the British anti-slavery movement, see
generally BETTY FLADELAND, MEN AND BRoTHERs: ANGLO-AMERIcAN ANTI-SLAvERY
COOPIEnATION (1972), and Ethan A. Nadelmann, GlobalProhibition Regimes: The Evolution of
Norms in International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479, 495 (1990).
23. On the workofDunant and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which spurred
the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Convention of 1899 and the movement toward
codified rules of conduct in warfare, see generally PmRan BoissIER, MsTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMrrrNE OF THE RED CRoss: FROM SOLFERiNO TO TsusHwA (1985), and
MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCMTY 69-88 (1996).
24. Onthework of add and Burritt, see Mark W. Janis, Protestants, Progress andPeace in
the Influence of Religion, in Tum INFLTENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONALLAw 223 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
25. See Kathryn Sikkdnk, Hwnan Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin
America, 47 ITft ORG. 411 (1993).
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among concerned individuals at the domestic, regional and international levels,
among government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international and
domestic, academics, and private foundations. Moreover, these norm entrepreneurs
seek national government officials and bureaucracies concerned with the same issue
areas and seek to enlist them as allies in their transnational cause. These
governmental norm. sponsors-for example, U.N. Human Rights Commissioner
Mary Robinson, Presidents Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, Jimmy Carter of the United
States, and the Pope, to take just a few prominent ones, use their official positions
to promote normative positions. These transnational actors then seek governmental
and nongovernmental fora competent to declare both general norms of international
law (e.g., -treaties) and specific interpretation of those norms in particular
circumstances (e.g., particular interpretations of treaties and customary
international law rules). Such law-declaring fora thus include treaty regimes;
domestic, regional, and international courts; ad hoc tribunals; domestic and regional
legislatures; executive entities; international publicists; and nongovernmental
organizations: law-declaring fora that create an "interpretive community" that is
capable of defining, elaborating and testing the definition of particular norms and
their violation.26
The next vertical step is for national governments to internalize norm-
interpretations issued by the global interpretive community into their domestic
bureaucratic and political structures. Within national governments and
intergovernmental organizations, for example, in-house lawyers and legal advisers
acquire institutional mandates to ensure that the government's policies conform to
international legal standards that have become imbedded in domestic law. Such
institutional mandates to justify noncompliance with international legal norms may
be found within the legal advising apparatus of national governments, in the
Executive Branch, (e.g., the Legal Adviser's Office at the U.S. State Department),
the legislature, as well as in intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the United
Nations, the OAS, etc.)."
In the same way as corporations develop standard operating procedures to
address new domestic mandates .regarding corporate sentencing guidelines,
occupational health and safety, and sexual harassment, domestic institutions adopt
standard operating procedures, and other internal mechanisms to maintain habitual
compliance with the internalized international norms. These institutions evolve in
path-dependent routes that avoid conflict with the internalized norms."8 Thus, over
time, domestic decisionmaking structures become "enmeshed" with international
26. The norm with respect to the recent genocide in Bosnia, for example, has been interpreted
before such law-declaring fore as the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council, the
International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda; the International Court of Justice, numerous scholarly groups, human rights
organizations, as well as both the Congress of the United States and a U.S. federal appellate court.
27. See Antonio Cassese, The Role of Legal Advisers in Ensuring that Foreign Policy
Conforms to InternationalLegal Standards, 14 MICH. J. INT'LL. 139 (1992); Robert C. Clark,
WhySoManyLawyers?Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FoRDHAML. REV. 275,282 (1992) (calling
lawyers "specialists in normative ordering").
28. See MarkJ. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 641,
643-44 (1996) (explaining path-dependence).
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legal norms, so that institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of
an international commitment become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes."s Gradually, legal ideologies come to prevail among domestic decision-
makers so that they seek to avoid perceptions that their actions will be perceived
as domestically unlawful. Finally, strong process linkages exist across issue areas.
Thus, when the United States adopts a twelve-mile limit in the ocean law area, for
example, it is bound by it when dealing with refugees sailing toward U.S. shores.3"
Because international legal obligations tend to be closely interconnected, even a
single deviation tends to lead noncompliant nations into vicious cycles of treaty
violation. These institutional habits soon lead nations into default patterns of
compliance. These patterns act like riverbeds, which channel conduct along
compliant pathways. When a nation deviates from that pattern of presumptive
compliance, frictions are created.
By so saying, I do not mean to suggest that international legal violations never
occur. I merely suggest viewing human rights enforcement through vertical,
"transnational legal process" lenses can help explain why in Louis Henkin's famous
phrase, "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law almost
all of the time."3 To avoid such frictions in its continuing interactions, a nation's
bureaucracies or interest groups may press their leaders to shift over time from a
policy of violation into one of compliance. Thus it is through this repeated cycle of
interaction, interpretation, and internalization-this transnational legal
process-that international law acquires its "stickiness," and that nations come to
"obey" international human rights law out of a perceived self-interest that becomes
institutional habit.
29. See Robert O. Keohane, Compliance with International Commitments: Politics Within
aFrameworkofLaw,InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges,
86 AM. Soc'YINT'LL. PRoc. 167, 179 (1992) (discussing "institutional enmeshment," which
"occurs when domestic decision making with respect to an international commitment is affected
by the institutional arrangements established in the course of making or maintaining the
commitment").
30. For example, Presidential Proclamation 5928, which extended the U.S. territorial sea from
three to twelve miles in breadth, has since been followed throughout the U.S. executive branch as
if it were internal law, and has become the basis for binding, internal Coast Guard standard
operating procedures. In May 1992, the United States adopted a policy of interdicting fleeing
Haitins on the high seas and repatriating them summarily to Haiti, while bringing into the United
States for exclusion proceedings those Haitians who entered territorial waters. In November 1992,
the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a boat containing fleeing Haitian refugees ten miles off the coast
of Florida, and began making plans to repatriate the occupants. When the 1988 opinion of the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel was drawn to the Deputy Associate Attorney
General's attention, the Coast Guard consulted with the State and Justice Departments and brought
the boat into shore, rather than repatriating the occupants. See Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the
Office ofLegal Counselfrom Itself, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1993).
31. Louxs HENKiN, HowNATIoNs BEHAvE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
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C. The Pattern Illustrated
By telling the vertical story of transnational legal enforcement, I am not saying
that the "horizontal," international legal process picture is wrong. I am just saying
it is incomplete. A state-to-state process account simply does not capture the full
picture of how international human rights norms are currently generated, brought
into domestic systems, and then brought back up to the international level. Take,
for example, the recent international drive to limit the use of landmines, which
began almost twenty years ago.32 Despite the development and ratification of a
treaty earlier this century banning the use of landmines against civilians, an
international norm against the practice had not developed.
Instead, the key step toward a global ban on landmines was taken by non-
governmental organizations in conjunction with the efforts of one U.S. senator. At
the end of 1991, a group of nongovernmental activists met in Washington, D.C. and
decided to create the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which had the
elimination of landmines as its goal.33 The organization enlisted the support of a
governmental norm entrepreneur, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, who introduced a measure,
passed by the Congress and signed by President Bush in 1992, which prohibited the
export of landmines by the United States for one year.34 Soon, the non-
governmental organizations received the support of other transnational figures,
including Pope John Paul II," Princess Diana,36 and the International Committee
of the Red Cross. Frustrated with what they perceived to be a lack of progress
toward a total ban through the U.N.-sponsored efforts, non-governmental
organization and other countries created a new law-declaring forum, the so-called
"Ottawa process," in the process enlisting another governmental sponsor, Canadian
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. In the end, the Ottawa process reached
agreement on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 7 which has now
been signed by more than 120 countries. Although the United States initially
declined to sign the Convention, the new regime prodded the United States to enact
a moratorium on the sale of landmines, to develop new technologies to aid in mine
detection and denmining, and to increase the amount of money that it spends on these
programs to at least $100 million per year.3" The United States further committed
itself to stop using all antipersonnel mines except in Korea by 2003, and to sign the
32. For a fuller account of this campaign, see KohFrankelLecture, supra note 8, at 655-63.
33. See Raymond Banner, How a Group of Outsiders Moved Nations to Ban Land Mines,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, at A5.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Roxanne Roberts, From London, a Blitz with Glitz; Princess Diana Dazzles a
Red Cross Benefitfor LandMine Victims, WASH. POST, June 18, 1997, at Dl. Princess Diana
visited landmine victims in Angola and Bosnia in early 1997. See Raymond Bonner, Pentagon
Weighs Ending Opposition to a Ban on Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at Al.
37. Sept. 18, 1997,36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997).
38. See Anthony DePalma, Some See Opportunity in Global Push to Remove LandMines,
N.Y. TIvES, Dec. 7, 1997, at A14.
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treaty itself by the year 2006. Although it remains to be seen whether the Senate
will soon ratify the Convention, the United States government may, within the next
decade, obey the Convention by fully internalizing the Convention's norms into the
governing practices of the U.S. government.
Note that under the vertical, transnational enforcement story that I have told, the
central actors are not so much governmental entities as nongovernmental
organizations and individuals. Today, modern transnational norm entrepreneurs
include most of our recent Nobel Peace Prize winners: Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi,
East Timor's Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, Tibet's Dalai Lama, Britain's
Amnesty International, and America's Martin Luther King, Jr. and Jody Williams
of the Landmines Coalition. These are people who without governmental portfolio
are able to transact a different kind of process, focusing at times on creating new
forums to develop new international norms. Their focus is less on the horizontal
process among nation states as upon what I call "vertical" or transnational process.
Their effort is to try to bring human rights law home, by trying to internalize it into
domestic systems through a process of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization.
How, precisely, is this internalization accomplished? In earlier work, I have
sought to distinguish among social, political and legal internalization:
" Social internalization, I argue, occurs when a norm acquires so much public
legitimacy that there is widespread general adherence to it.
* Political internalization occurs when the political elites accept an international
norm, and advocate its adoption as a matter of government policy.
* Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the
domestic legal system through executive action, legislative action, judicial
interpretation, or some combination of the three. Some legal systems establish
their receptivity to internalization of international norms through constitutional
law rules regarding the extent to which treaties are or are not self-executing and
rules of customary international law are or are not automatically incorporated into
domestic law.39 Virtually all legal systems also have explicit mechanisms
whereby executive, legislative, and judicial institutions may domesticate
international norms. Thus, the landmines case exemplified the incorporation of
an emerging norm of international law into U.S. law and policy largely through
the executive action of the President and his agencies. Legislative internalization
occurs when international law norms are embedded into constitutional norms or
binding domestic legislation that officials of a noncomplying government must
obey as part of the domestic legal fabric. Judicial internalization occurs when
litigation in domestic courts provokes judicial incorporation of international law
norms into domestic law, statutes, or constitutional norms.
The precise sequencing among political, legal, and social internalization, and
among the different forms of legal internalization, will vary from case to case.
39. The national constitutions of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Italy, for example, refer to the
recognition of international legal principles as a broad policy goal, thereby requiring policymakers
to take account of foreign policy guidelines deriving from international law. See IRH CONST. art.
29, § 3; GRONDWET [Constitution] [GRw. NED.] art. 90 (Netherlands); CoNsTrruzloNE
[Constitution] [CosT.] art. 10 (Italy).
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Sometimes an international norm is socially internalized long before it is politically
or legally internalized. Thus, for example, the United States was the moving force
behind the drafting and signature of the Genocide Convention in 1948, but the U.S.
Senate did not formally ratify the Convention and implement it as U.S. domestic law
until November 1988, long after the norm against genocide had acquired
widespread social legitimacy." In other cases, legal norm-internalization prompted
by a transnational legal process of interaction and internalization helps to trigger
the process of political and social internalization of global norms. By domesticating
international rules, transnational legal process thereby spurs internal acceptance of
international human rights principles.
The process can be viewed as having four phases: interaction, interpretation,
internalization, and obedience. One or more transnational actors provokes an
interaction (or series of interactions) with another in a law-declaring forum, which
forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the
situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party,
but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other
party's internal normative system. Its aim is to "bind" that other party to obey the
interpretation as part of its internal value set. That party's perception that it now
has an internal obligation to follow the international norm as it has been
domestically interpreted leads it to step four: obedience to the newly interpreted
norm.
Take, for example, the efforts of U.S. courts to define a U.S. law of torture under
the Alien Tort Statute since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala." The U.S. Senate has been
traditionally reluctant to ratify human rights treaties, even though the U.S.
Government was one of the primary drafters of these treaties in the postwar era. The
Torture Convention, the Genocide Convention, and many others lay unratified by
the U.S. government despite this initial input. In 1980, beginning with Filartiga,
private U.S. human rights lawyers began to bring a series of domestic lawsuits
against foreign violators to promote domestic judicial incorporation of the norm
against torture under a little-known eighteenth century statute, the Alien Tort
Statute. Over fifteen decades, a string of U.S. courts have ruled that torture is a
violation not only of international law, but also of U.S. law. In the early 1990s,
these legal internalizations of the norm against torture were cited as precedents for
Congress to enact a Torture Victim Protection Act,42 a statute whose drafting and
enactment helped persuade skeptical officials of the Bush Administration to
acquiesce in U.S. ratification of the U.N. Torture Convention. Once again, an
international law norm trickled down, was internalized, and bubbled back up into
new international law.
40. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (The Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No.
100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1994)).
41. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that Paraguayan human rights
victims may sue Paraguayan official under Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), in U.S.
court for civil damages arising from official torture). For a theoretical analysis of this line of
doctrine, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(1991).
42. Pub. L. No. 102-256,106 Stat 73 (1992) (codified at28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
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In the United Kingdom, the issue of legislative internalization has similarly been
brought to the forefront in recent years by the election of the Labour party, which
promised, if elected, to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into
United Kingdom law. This issue has been a major human rights issue in British
politics since the Clement Attlee Government first ratified the Convention in the
early 1950's. Since then, the Convention has been internalized in part through
judicial construction. When total judicial incorporation efforts failed, a political
internalization movement arose, which at this writing will shortly bring about legal
internalization of the European Convention into U.K. law by an act of Parliament.43
Or, take finally the cases of the Haitian and Cuban boat people, in which my
students and I were involved for several years. The United States had signed and
ratified the Refugee Convention of 195 1,4 a multilateral treaty at the "horizontal"
level whereby it agreed not to return refugees to their persecutors. But when the
Haitian refugees began fleeing to the United States in 1991, it effectively reneged
on that commitment and began to return the refugees, claiming that the Refugee
Convention did not bar extraterritorial repatriations. In fact, Congress had passed
a statute as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act which required
unequivocally that refugees not be returned to their persecutors, thus ostensibly
internalizing the treaty into domestic statute. And so on behalf of the Haitian
refugees my students and I brought a lawsuit in which we argued that the courts
should enforce the extraterritorial nonreturn rule as a matter of U.S. domestic law.
We used a "judicialization strategy" to try to reinforce the concept of legal
internalization of the international norm against extraterritorial repatriations.
In the end, the Supreme Court rejected our arguments, leaving the United States
legally free to continue the extraterritorial return policy. But other international
forums, such as the U.N. High Commission on Refugees, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and other bodies began to condemn the U.S. action.
Various legislative efforts were made to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling, and
43. The debate over incorporation of the European Human Rights Convention is the subject
of a voluminous literature. For a poitical history of the incorporation effort, see generally MCHAEL
ZANDER, A BILL oF RiGurs? (4th ed. 1997). For a comparative study, see ANDREw Z.
DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 177-87 (1983); ASPECTS OF INCORPORATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN
RIGHS INToDomnCLAw (J.P. Gardner ed., 1993); Jorg Polakiewicz & Valerie Jacob-Foltzer,
The European Hwnan Rights Convention in Domestic Law, 12 HuM. RTs. J. 65, 65-85, 125-42
(1991). For discussion of compliance without incorporation, see DAVID KINLEY, THE EUROPEAN
CoNvmnON ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPLIANCE WrrHOuT INCORPORATION (1993). See also 8(2)
HALSBURY'S LAws oF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1996) (including human rights law as part of
constitutional law). For bills urging incorporation, see Human Rights Bill, as approved by the
House of Lords, 577 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1726 (1997). For arguments as to why the
Convention should be incorporated, see generally HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNrrED KINGDOM
(Richard Gordon & Richard Wilmot-Smith eds., 1996); Hon. Sir John Laws, Is the High Court
the Guardian ofFwdamental ConstitutionalRights?, 1992 PUB. L. 59; Lord Lester, The Mouse
thatRoareak The Hunan Rights Bifl 1995,1995 PuB. L. 198; Rt Hon. Lord Browne-Wilkinson,
The Infiltration of a Bill ofRights, 1992 PUB. L. 397.
44. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137.
45. For analysis of the opinions, see Clawson et al, supra note 6.
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the issue later became the subject of domestic political pressure from the African-
American community, the Congressional Black Caucus, and Trans-Africa, all of
whom began to promote the notion of a safe haven for Haitian refugees. Finally, in
the fall of 1994, the U.S. government changed its Haitian policy, and intervened to
return the refugees. When the issue arose again the following year, with regard to
fleeing Cuban refugees, the Administration first resisted, then ultimately admitted
into the United States those Cuban refugees being detained at offshore refugee
camps. Although the U.S. stated policy remains problematic, at this writing, the
actual practice of the U.S. government has moved into greater compliance with
international law.
III. CONCLUSION
Let me close with two thoughts. First, the foregoing analysis teaches something
about our duty, as citizens, to participate in transnational legal process. It is
sometimes said that someone who, by acquiring medical training, comes to
understand the human body acquires as well a moral duty not just to observe
disease, but to try to cure it. In the same way, I would argue, a lawyer who acquires
knowledge of the body politic acquires a duty not simply to observe transnational
legal process, but to try to influence it. Once one comes to understand the process
by which international human rights norms can be generated and internalized into
domestic legal systems, one acquires a concomitant duty, I believe, to try to
influence that process, to try to change the feelings of that body politic to promote
greater obedience with international human rights norms.
In that effort, every citizen counts. To this, many Americans might say, "What can
one person really do? Isn't such influence beyond the capacity of any one person?"
But if you look at these people I have mentioned in this lecture-Aung Sun Suu
Kyi, Jody Williams, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr.--could they have not
said the same thing? In response, many students might say: "But surely, I am not
such a world historical figure," to which I would answer, "You don't need to be a
Nobel Prize winner to make a difference. Just look at Rosa Parks, or Linda Brown,
or Fred Korematsu, ordinary people who simply said that they would not go to the
back of the bus, or attend a segregated school, or live in a Japanese internment
camp." In short, we need look no further than those individuals who have triggered
these legal processes in our own lifetime to promote the enforcement of human
rights norms.
The struggle of these individuals reminds us again of the remarkable words of
Robert Kennedy, which are etched on his grave in Arlington Cemetery:
Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or
strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing
each other from a million different centers of energy and daring, those ripples
build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and
resistance.
What he is talking about, in the end,. is the need for individuals to activate
transnational legal process. As proof that what he says is indeed possible, one need
look only at the country in which he said those words: South Africa, in 1966, a
country which only three decades later has now been totally transformed by
international human rights law.
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So, in closing, if my question is "how is international human rights law
enforced?", my answer is simple. International human rights law is enforced, I
would say, not just by nation-states, not just by government officials, not just by
world historical figures, but by people like us, by people with the courage and
commitment to bring international human rights law home through a transnational
legal process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.46 Thank you very
much.
46. Author's note: Since I wrote these words, my life has fundamentally changed. In
November 1998, Itook an oath as our nation's chief human rights official. At this writing, I have
now spent eight months in office, traveling to some twenty-five countries. As I have traveled from
Belgrade to Beijing, Colombia to Kosovo, I have become increasingly convinced of the correctness
of the basic thesis I have expressed in this Lecture. Although I now spend my time as a
"governmental norm sponsor," rather than as a private "transnational norm entrepreneur," I
continue to witness, and to attempt to influence, the transnational legal process described herein.
I look forward to retuming to academic life before too long, not only to finish my book manuscript
on "WhyNations Obey," but also to illustrate my basic thesis with reference to my governmental
experiences in Kosovo, China, Colombia, Indonesia, and elsewhere.
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